Dele Alli, Steven Bergwijn, Giovani Lo Celso and Vinicius were all taken off at the interval for Pierre-Emile Hoejbjerg, Erik Lamela, Lucas Moura and Heung-Min Son – then Gareth Bale was soon replaced by Harry Kane. What was striking about Spurs in the first half was their ability to bypass Antwerp’s press, but then create very few chances.
When the ball went back to Hugo Lloris, Antwerp would be high up the pitch, stopping simple balls out from the goalkeeper to the two central midfielders, centre backs or full backs.
Lloris wasn’t afraid to kick the ball long – which seemed to be the right approach. Vinicius and Gareth Bale both showed at times they were able to win the first ball, and then other members of the front four were able to pick up the knock downs, or flick ons, and move towards Antwerp’s goal.
The issue with Tottenham’s build up play came afterwards. The passing was very deliberate and to feet most of the time – with nothing direct, or even penetrative, being made besides Lloris’s kicks. Dele Alli gave the ball away in the final third, and in the opposition’s penalty area, several times mainly due to a lack of off ball movement. There were no Tottenham players moving Antwerp defenders around, or running into space.
However, Antwerp moved well off the ball. When Haroun’s run wasn’t tracked because Reguilon didn’t tag Miyoshi off to Lo Celso, Davies was pulled out wide forcing Winks to follow Mbokani’s run.
Refaelov moved into what would have been Wink’s zone and manged to get a shot away.
Antwerp’s goal actually came from their press and Tottenham’s lack of movement. Spurs were forced back to Ben Davies, who couldn’t see any options, only to be pressured by Mbokani who won the ball.
This led to a two on one, and Mbokani squared it to Refaelov who scored.
Despite the changes in the second half it appeared the ship had sailed for Spurs. They were much more direct, made better runs and tried to be more aggressive in their passing, but still struggled to find the right ball in a crowded final third. The Belgian side were more than happy to sit back, invite Tottenham’s pressure and attack on the counter – creating chances doing so.
Even when Kane dropped deep (as he has done numerous times this season) and Son and Moura pushed on, Antwerp still defended incredibly well. Kane could drag one centre back away from Antwerp’s back line, but they still had another two in their three-man defence, meaning they would be in a position to recover.
Is this a problem for Spurs going forward? Probably not. They moved off the ball much better in the second half, and the issues that led to their loss appeared, on the surface, to be personnel based. Davies has normally been a left back under Mourinho, despite playing at centre back in the previous Europa League game against LASK, and he was given a hard time by Mbokani. The front four, that offered little to no movement, were completely replaced by the hour mark.
Another international break is here, and Gareth Southgate has reasons to be excited and terrified in equal measure.
With the weekend’s, shall we say, eventful round of Premier League fixtures behind us, England are back. But what happened in those same fixtures seem like a microcosm for what the Three Lions are going to have to deal with over their next few games.
It’s not an exaggeration to say that England have one of the best front threes in international football. But the same sentiment cannot be echoed for their goalkeeping and centre back situations.
What makes this international break interesting is the depth and influx of attacking talent England seem to have.
The usual front three suspects (Sterling, Kane and Sancho) were all called up for the three matches against Wales, Belgium and Denmark. Everyone’s favourite footballer right now, Marcus Rashford, was also called up – and he, again, is normally a part of the set-up. There have also been call ups for Tammy Abraham, Dominic Calvert-Lewin and Danny Ings. Mason Greenwood impressed enough towards the end of last season to be included in the squad for the previous two matches against Iceland and Denmark.
Meanwhile, Harry Kane’s ‘new’ position has seemed to pique some interest. When Tottenham Hotspur beat Southampton 5-2 on the 20th of September, a lot was made of how Kane dropped deep and played the passes forward to Heung-Min Son, who was running beyond him. And rightly so – he assisted on all four of Son’s goals whilst still managing to get on the scoresheet himself.
“Harry Kane, in my opinion, changed the game,” said Jose Mourinho, when talking about the second half of that match.
“His movement was tremendous, his link play was absolutely incredible, and he allowed Son to play in a different position.”
Despite Pierre-Emile Hojbjerg’s “two or three little points” for Spurs before they faced his old club, Kane was indeed incredible – and he appeared in similar positions when Spurs beat Manchester United 6-1 this weekend. He sat deeper at times, and Son was the one furthest forward. Kane again assisted him for Tottenham’s second.
But dropping deeper is something he’s done before for England, if not incredibly often. In the 2018 World Cup, more than likely due to Southgate’s 3-5-2, he was the one who would retrieve the ball in more withdrawn positions, and look for Sterling’s forward runs as a way to bring England up the pitch.
Abraham, Calvert-Lewin and Ings must provide something different it seems.
Abraham scored 15 goals last year, even if he’s now behind Timo Werner at Chelsea, and Ings scored only one goal fewer than the Premier League’s top scorer, Jamie Vardy, last season. Being central strikers it’s hard for them to break into the side above Kane, but that’s what makes Dominic Calvert-Lewin such an intriguing proposition.
If Southgate doesn’t want someone to drop deep, and feels that his midfield can help get the team forward and bring others into play, Calvert-Lewin (in current form) would prove useful. He was called a “complete striker” by Carlo Ancelotti, although many would say that he’s not as complete as Kane.
Emulating Filippo Inzaghi was the challenge set by his manager, as Ancelotti wanted Calvert-Lewin to become more of a poacher.
“Now I’m focusing on getting in-between the sticks and putting the ball in the back of the net.
“Not to say that I’m a carbon copy of Pippo Inzaghi, but there are elements of his game that I’ve been showing in my game at the moment.”
Calvert-Lewin has scored nine goals in six games so far this season. All have been after taking very few touches, and all have been in the box. He’s shown his strength and ability in the air, along with great movement in the penalty area. Not to describe Calvert-Lewin as ‘just’ a poacher, or to claim that he’s a better finisher than Kane, but he provides more depth and a different option for England in the forward areas.
But Kane has been England’s number nine, captain, and focal point for so long. Playing as the furthest man forward is why he’s got 32 goals in 47 caps. But does he need a rest? It has been a point of contention recently, so don’t be surprised if Dominic Calvert-Lewin gets his first cap for England in a start against Wales.
While getting the ball in the back of the net doesn’t seem like it will be a problem for England, keeping it out of their own net might be.
After this weekend, the goalkeeping situation seems bad. However, it doesn’t appear to be a serious concern.
Of the three goalkeepers selected for England by Southgate, Dean Henderson had the best weekend by simply not playing.
Ancelotti didn’t seem too worried, saying: “Nothing happened – we have three points.”
So, Pickford shouldn’t fear losing his place. Southgate obviously has confidence in him, and rightly so – some of the best performances of Pickford’s career have come for England. He’s shown he can make big saves and his distribution has proved key for mounting counter attacks in the past.
The people in front of Pickford probably will be fearing for their places. This weekend the centre back play was ugly. At best.
Two of the centre backs called up, and the two that would arguably be the first-choice pairing, played in back lines on Sunday that let in 13 goals between them.
Harry Maguire’s lack of pace has been an issue for Manchester United for longer than just this season. You could also argue that he was at fault for three of Tottenham’s goals this weekend. Pulling down his own teammate, who was trying to clear the ball, was probably his lowest moment against Spurs – and Ndombele scored because of it.
Both Maguire and Gomez are more than struggling for form. John Stones must be rueing the fact he’s not got a decent run for Manchester City in so long. That and the £60 million spent on Ruben Dias.
Because of the play of Maguire and Gomez, we may get a look at a Michael Keane and Eric Dier partnership at some point in the next week, or possibly a return to the 3-5-2. Many of the other defenders in the squad are used to playing with three centre backs for their clubs – including Conor Coady, Ainsley Maitland-Niles and Bukayo Saka. Plus, Kyle Walker and Kieran Trippier played well in that system during the 2018 World Cup.
It all depends on what Gareth Southgate wants to do. He may tweak some things against Wales. That’s what International Friendlies are for, right?
Obviously, Greenwood and Sterling aren’t going to appear in the next three games, and that could mean Harvey Barnes and Jack Grealish play in more forward-thinking roles for England. Grealish plays out wide for Aston Villa, allowing him to see the whole pitch and create, while Barnes can play close to the striker – as he does for Leicester.
Everything considered, we’ll soon see how Southgate decides to set England up. But one thing is for sure – he has choices to make, both good and bad.
Better late than never, but here’s a look at Manchester City against Arsenal on Wednesday night – and Pep Guardiola’s old, but not outdated, tactics.
No one would disagree if someone said that sport is about evolution.
It’s about taking what those have done before you, what people are doing now, and building upon those ideas to make something better. To make something that is all conquering and unbeatable. To make something that beats even the ideas you based it upon.
Pep Guardiola has done just that, building upon the ideas of Arrigo Sacchi’s Milan and, especially, Johan Cruyff’s Barcelona.
It’s no secret how much of an impact Cruyff had on Guardiola – his famous quote is: “Johan Cruyff painted the chapel, and Barcelona coaches since merely restore or improve it.”
In short, what Pep does is based upon what Cruyff did. In turn, what Cruyff did was based upon what Rinus Michels, his manager at Ajax in the 1970s, did. That great Ajax side played a 433 that turned into a 343 – dominating possession and dropping a midfielder into the defence (essentially having three backs).
Cruyff did the same at Barcelona when he was in charge – playing a 343, and controlling possession with a greater number of midfielders than the opposing team. This was dependent on the fact that Cruyff’s team had, in essence, two diamonds. These diamonds helped create passing angles for both the back three and the midfielders.
The player at the tip of the diamond (in this team, Guardiola) that involved the back three, would also form the base of the diamond in the midfield (although incredibly narrow in the first one, it is seen in the two images below):
The outside centre backs would eventually sit as wide as they could (along with the wingers, who didn’t play as conventional wing backs) which made the pitch as big as possible – an advantage when attacking. This formation also helped the central midfielders in-between the lines, placing them in the inside left or right positions, allowing them to find space.
So getting to Guardiola.
He did a similar thing when he was Barcelona manager. He created a back three when on the ball by spreading his centre backs (Piqué and Puyol or Mascherano) out incredibly wide, and dropping Busquets in-between them to make a three, which is useful against teams playing two strikers (below):
With the two full backs in the wide areas of midfield, it makes a de facto 343. He did something like this at Bayern Munich, letting Thiago or Philipp Lahm come deeper and sit between the centre backs, or by completely inverting his full backs into midfielders during the build up.
What’s this got to do with Manchester City on Wednesday? This provides a little bit of context before diving into how Guardiola set his team up.
Namely, decades later, the same tactical ideas still prevail.
Where this is going may well be obvious to some. City, of course, set up in a 433 formation to start (below):
This 433 is what City held when they were defending.
The principle that Guardiola subscribes to, is that of making the pitch as big as possible when attacking and as small as possible when defending. The same principle as Cruyff.
This is done with City’s press as it prevents the other team starting comfortable build up play. If they don’t win the ball back instantly, they stay in this 433 formation – making sure the opposition have no space to exploit.
But what was noticeable (when considering the 433 becoming the 343) was what City did in possession.
In the pivot role, Gündogan still picked the ball up from the two central defenders – either Laporte or Garcia. But he wasn’t alone. Kyle Walker also stepped into midfield several times.
This let Laporte step up into the same horizontal midfield level as Walker, just behind Gündogan. By inverting a full back Manchester City had made a diamond that started at the defence (below):
That image also shows the advantage of doing so. Aubameyang has come inside and followed Walker, which, although not seen, has given Mahrez on the right acres of space. But if he didn’t come inside, City would completely overrun midfield. It’s done again here:
The space this movement created led to Manchester City’s first goal. That and David Luiz.
Mahrez and De Bruyne had swapped positions. Mahrez was in the inside right, and De Bruyne was wide, which, due to Aubameyang cutting infield to follow Walker, meant he was in plenty of space. This space allowed him to get his head up and put the ball in the box that Luiz didn’t properly clear. That mistake led to Sterling scoring (below):
As mentioned, Guardiola wants the pitch to be as big as possible when attacking. The wide men become so important in this. If Walker is inverted, De Bruyne or Mahrez need to be in that position on the right hand side to spread the defence out and create more space for others.
On the other side Mendy was the one staying wide. This came into effect with Manchester City’s first goal. Mendy’s width meant Sterling was free to come inside, allowing him to get into the box and score.
With Walker in midfield, Mendy needed to be hugging the touchline, providing width and creating space (an example of this below):
But was it specifically designed to be a diamond starting at the defence?
This becomes unclear with how the midfield was shaped at times.
The reasoning may be more to do with sheer numbers as opposed to certain shapes, but the foundation that Cruyff laid is still there. Outnumber the players in midfield to dominate the ball, all while making the pitch as big as possible. This photo shows Manchester City have the numbers – but it’s hardly a diamond (below):
You can note that Saka may be closing Gündogan down, negating their numerical advantage in midfield. But if he does, again, Mendy will be in space – as De Bruyne was with the goal.
Walker stepped into midfield to essentially create a 343. Gündogan was at the tip of the defensive diamond and – with Silva and De Bruyne in the half spaces – at the base of an attacking one. That formation would look something like (but not exactly depending on positional interchanges) this image below:
Although not using the exact same system, Pep has built upon an idea used in the 1990s, which itself was built upon an idea used in the 1970s. It’s one of those things that once noticed, cannot be unnoticed. Once it’s been done, it cannot be undone.
History repeats itself. Maybe because time is a flat circle. Or a flat diamond.
Hopefully this made sense – I thought it was amazing that the same ideas from the 1990s are still being used today. I’m only writing about football right now because it’s all that’s going on, but, who knows what the future may hold. If you want to see any videos on tactics, this is a great watch and super informative in regards to the real ins and outs of Cruyff’s system.
I’m attempting to dip my toe into the deep, fascinating waters of football tactics. So here’s a very simple, and very short, look at Cristiano Ronaldo against AC Milan in the Coppa Italia.
Cristiano Ronaldo is used to being the centre of attention.
Nothing’s changed in that regard here – especially since I decided to focus on him when Juventus played AC Milan in the second leg of their Coppa Italia semi-final yesterday.
The highlighted zone below shows, incredibly simply, where he operated. In basic terms, he was looking to get touches on the ball in the space in-between the lines for a shot, or make late runs into the box to score from crosses (and sometimes, a mixture of the two).
Ronaldo played up front with Douglas Costa and Paulo Dybala either side of him. Initially, Ronaldo wasn’t playing on the shoulder of Milan’s defenders, or looking to run in behind and create space either. He moved in the space in-between the Milan defence and midfield.
You can see that in the photos below. In this one, he’s in-between the midfield and defence (demonstrated by the blue lines) so he can get a shot off when he’s closer towards Milan’s goal.
In this photo you can see that even after Milan had a man sent off and were playing deeper, leaving less space, he was still finding room to move.
But as the match went on this wasn’t his only course of action.
He wasn’t just dropping deep like a False 9 to get involved, or simply sitting in space. The highlighted zone in the first image shows that he had the freedom to move out wide – which he did. This is shown in the photo below, even if it is on the break (which Ronaldo can still execute as well as anyone in the world).
Another example of this was in the 18th minute, just after the sending off. It also includes what he was doing earlier.
Ronaldo was on the left wing, and eventually drifted inside, finding a pocket of space. Even as the play moved towards Milan’s box, he still didn’t make a run into the area straight away. He was very methodical with his movement, and always wanted to get involved in the build up play.
When he did get the ball outside the box and in front of the defenders, he, as you would expect, operated a shoot on sight policy.
In the photo below Dybala has the ball on the right hand side of the penalty area. Some Centre Forwards might make runs like the ones illustrated by the blue arrows – either to receive a pass and shoot when closer to the goal, or to drag defenders with them and give Dybala more space for a one on one.
Instead Ronaldo sat outside the area, received a pass from Dybala, showed some skill on the ball to shift it on to his left foot and then shot (that movement is shown with the red arrow). He’s got it in his repertoire to score from there, so why shouldn’t he have a go when he has the chance?
That photo shows what I mean (hopefully). Combining all the points of sitting in space, shooting when possible, and not making runs into the box all the time.
The corner that led to Juventus’s penalty was from Ronaldo not running towards goal straight away. He sat off, no one was in the box, so Dybala had a shot from outside the area. It then deflected off a defender for the corner.
But this wasn’t all he did. We all know Ronaldo loves to get on the end of crosses. So when he saw the opportunity to make runs into the box he obliged – they just weren’t constant. He does this in the photos below.
Here he is looking to get on the end of Danilo’s cross.
Here he’s calling for a ball in from Bernardeschi, seeing the space in the penalty area.
Here he’s moving off the back of the midfielder.
Then after that, he runs towards goal to get on the end of a cross (if Dybala lays it off on the overlap to his right) or pick up any spills from the keeper.
So a mix of finding space deep and then making late runs is what Ronaldo went with. He did lay the ball off at times to run into the penalty area, and then get on the end of a cross. In the 12th minute he drops deep to get a touch, lays it off for Pjanic who spreads the ball out to the right, then makes a late run into the box to get on the end of a ball in.
Even if he did shoot nine times without scoring and had a penalty saved – this variance in play easily shows why Ronaldo is Ronaldo.
Like I said, very short and very simple. It’s a bit of something different, hopefully I’ll try and do some more tactical stuff like this, but hopefully in a bit more detail. Maybe I’m stating the obvious writing something that is essentially, ‘Ronaldo is good at football’ but, it was fun to do regardless.
Full disclosure, I am Nottingham Forest fan, but, bear with me.
First thing’s first, great win last night.
Forest hadn’t won any of the last 10 games they’d played against Cardiff, and had only picked up 2 points since beating Leeds 2-0 on the 8th of February (albiet, not scoring against QPR at home last match in, shall we say, strange circumstances).
In my time following Forest, the most successful Championship seasons were the ones under Billy Davies, when they made it to the playoffs. That was quite a while ago – basically 10 years ago.
When Billy Davies most recently took Forest into the Championship playoffs to play Swansea, they won 56 points at home that season, losing only 3 games – taking the game to the opposition. Sabri Lamouchi’s Forest don’t really play like that, their best results seeming to come when they have less of the ball.
Maybe that would suggest that Forest need someone with a little creativity to make something happen at home when they should have more of the ball. Joao Carvahlo fits that mould, but, it seems pretty obvious that Lamouchi doesn’t really fancy him, and why would he change a side that is currently 3rd to fit him in? But that’s another conversation for another day.
But this difference in style doesn’t matter. In the Championship it’s all about picking up points, and Lamouchi has a team that does this. A team.
And I love this team.
You saw it against West Brom when Matty Cash scored that equaliser in injury time – everyone going all out, and never quitting.
Speaking of Matty Cash, he has been superb this season – and everyone knows all about the tackles and the possible Poland call up. Last night’s goalscorer, Tiago Silva, has had a good season too, although (as a friend mentioned to me last night) could do with a little more consistency in certain parts of his game (like goalscoring).
Sammy Ameobi is an enigma, often snatching embarrassment from the jaws of pure class. Joe Lolley seems to be coming into form after shaky start to season and getting over the election. Grabban might have gone off the boil, not scoring since a 1-1 draw against Reading in January, but you saw his class with his assist for Silva last night.
But still, I love this side. Brice Samba is a hero in every sense of the word, and has been fantastic in goal this year, bringing something Forest have needed in an age – a competent goalkeeper.
But, you can have a great team in the Championship, and it means nothing. Ask Leeds last year. Yes teams like Brighton in 2015/16 and Middlesbrough the season before that struggled in the playoffs but got promoted automatically in the years after, but having a good season means nothing in the playoffs – it’s about getting hot at the right time.
This is why I hate the Championship. It’s a mess. It’s always been a mess. It’s so congested between 2nd and 6th. It’s not like good teams get promoted, and you never have to see any good sides ever again – parachute payments mean good teams go up, and the ones that come down just take their place. You have to take any chance you get in this division.
Forest have been in this league for over a decade now.
It’s incredibly tough. But (touch wood) if Forest can stay in the playoff places, I like them against a Fulham or a Brentford. They will come on to Forest and dominate the ball – which suits them perfectly. But then again, if either of them come into the playoffs with some form, it doesn’t matter – it’s the team playing well that usually wins (like Aston Villa last year).
The Championship is a tough place to be, and that’s why I hate it. One game is a win away against Brentford, the next is a loss to Birmingham. The next game is a win against Leeds, the one after that is a loss at home against Charlton. It’s not exciting, it’s stressful.
I don’t mean literal moving goalposts. That’s not why they’re 22 points clear. I mean that for some reason, Jurgen Klopp and Liverpool’s recent success always seems to be good, but then not good enough.
When Jurgen Klopp walked on to the pitch in Madrid for the last Champions League final, Liverpool had lost every final he’d taken them to. They hadn’t won a single thing.
At that time he’d only won one cup final as a manager – a 5-2 win over Bayern Munich in the 2012 DFB-Pokal with Borussia Dortmund. Klopp had lost 6 of his 7 appearances in major cup finals (I’m not going to list them all, look at them yourself).
And (rightly so) questions were asked of Klopp and Liverpool. Could they win anything? Could he win anything? Football teams (and pets) seem to take on the personality of their managers (and owners), and Liverpool had taken on Klopp’s image of the ‘nearly men’ – and taken on all the good stuff too, the power, the pace, the passion, you know it all.
But they hadn’t won anything. That’s why that final against Tottenham Hotspur was so important. (Side note: it was important for Mauricio Pochettino as Spurs hadn’t won anything either, and with far less appearances in cup finals. Look where he is now)
Lo and behold, Liverpool win the final. Cue scenes on Merseyside, hailing Klopp as a genius, Virgil van Dijk’s Ballon d’Or campaign, and so on and so forth. The tables had turned, and so they should have – the collective monkey was off everyone’s backs.
They also finished with 97 points in the league that season and still came second to Manchester City’s 98. (Side note: They had 0.02 less Points Per Game than City that season. What a mad season)
Did the goalposts begin to move? How can you be bottler if you’ve won a trophy? But still, letting City win after being 10 points clear is a fair criticism – if you want to be champions, you can’t let that happen. I would argue that Klopp just needed that first trophy to give them lift off, but again, fair point.
Now here we are in February 2020. Liverpool have basically won the Premier League. All that’s left is for them to cross the t’s and dot the i’s. The number of Premier League records they can break is endless (again, read them yourself, it’s mind boggling). Klopp has built possibly the greatest team the Premier League has ever seen.
But in my eyes, people are moving Liverpool’s goalposts.
The metaphorical ones. Every time they seem to accomplish something, it’s all of sudden a case of “yes that’s great, but what about this“. They became the first English side to win the Continental Treble when they won the Club World Cup in December. “Yes that’s great, but what about the English treble?”.
Liverpool haven’t won the league in about 30 years. They should go for it. And they have. But why do they have to go from only having to win one thing, to winning everything – in less than a year? Why do they have to win the treble? I’m not saying don’t go for it, I’m saying everyone needs to stop changing what Liverpool have to do to become a great team.
I understand why people say it, but Liverpool are team that could dominate for a decade, not just one year.
Why do we have to move the goalposts? Why can’t we just set them down, take a seat, and enjoy what we’re watching?